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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

INTRODUCTION

In 2012, a \-Vildfire destroyed numerous homes in the Pocatello area, including Plaintiffs'
residence at 9028 W. Autumn Lane, Pocatello, Idaho. Plaintiffs' residence was insured under a
homeowner's policy issued by Defendant Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois ("Safeco"). Per
the policy, Plaintiffs were entitled to either actual cash value (ACV) or cost incurred in replacing
the home.
Immediately following the fire, Safeco retained the services of Robert K. Jones to
provide an appraisal to determine the ACV of the home. After receiving the appraisal report,
Safeco promptly issued a check to Plaintiffs for the ACV value of the home pending
determination of the replacement cost.
Concurrently with the evaluation and payment of the ACV of the residence, Safeco
attempted to learn from Plaintiffs if they intended on rebuilding the house or purchasing a
different home. Although Plaintiffs were unsure, Safeco requested Belfor Property Restoration
("Belfor") to provide an estimate of the cost to rebuild the house. Even after receiving a copy of
the Belfor estimate, the Plaintiffs were undecided on whether to purchase a different home or
rebuild the house at Autumn Lane. Finally, in December 2012, Plaintiffs purchased a
replacement home outside of Idaho Falls.
Despite repeated requests, Plaintiffs did not provide the purchase documents
documenting the sale price of the new home, as requested by Safeco, until late May 2013. Upon
receiving the documents, Plaintiffs promptly paid the difference between the ACV previously
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disbursed and the Plaintiffs' replacement cost. Accordingly, Safeco complied with its contractual
obligations and was entitled to summary judgment as determined by the District Court.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDING BELOW
Plaintiffs' filed their Complaint on June 13,_ 2013. Defendant's Answer was filed on July

18, 2013.
Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on April 14, 2014. Subsequently, on
May 7, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to Rule 56(f), requesting additional time to
conduct discovery and prepare a response, premised on Plaintiffs' representation that they
needed additional portions of Defendant's electronic claims manual (CHARTS). Nevertheless,
on or about May 13, 2014, Plaintiffs submitted a Supplemental Affidavit in Reply to Defendant's

Memo Opposing Plaintiffs' Rule 56(/) Motion which set out Plaintiffs' argument in opposition to
Defendant's summary judgment motion.
At the May 27, 2014 hearing on Defendant's summary judgment hearing, the District
Court heard oral argument on the summary judgment motions, but granted Plaintiffs' Rule 56(t)
motion on a limited basis, ordering that Plaintiffs could submit an affidavit based on the
additional CHARTS documents.
On September 18, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment

and to Amend, together with a memorandum of law and the Declaration of Charles M Miller.
Defendant responded on February 9, 2015. The hearing on the cross-motions for summary
judgment was held on February 25, 2015, and the District Court issued its written decision
granting summary judgment to Defendant on April 23, 2015.
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A judgment was entered on April 23, 2015. Plaintiffs appealed the April 2015 Judgment
on June 2, 2015. An Amended Judgment, which included an award of costs to Defendant, was
entered on October 7, 2015 .1 Plaintiffs did not appeal the latter judgment.

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

....1

Background and Fire

For approximately 19 years, Mr. and Mrs. Parks lived at a house located at 9028 West
Autumn Lane in Pocatello, Idaho. R. 14,

,r 4;

R. 522-523 (pp. 5-6). The house at Autumn Lane

was destroyed in a fire on June 28, 2012. R. 14, ,r 7. (Obviously, the lot was not destroyed in the
fire, and, in fact, Plaintiffs still retain the lot). R. 209 (p. 19, L. 22 - p. 20, L. 1); R. 524 (p. 10,
LL 6-8).
During the time the Parks lived at the Autumn Lane residence, it was insured through a
policy issued by Safeco. R. 523 (pp. 6, LL 6-8); R. 210 (p. 24, L. 20 - p. 25, L. 3). Mrs. Parks
testified that she never spoke to her insurance agent about the wording of the policy because she
"felt it was understandable." R. 523 (p. 7, LL 13-17). It is notable that Mrs. Parks has a
bachelor's degree in English and two years of graduate schooling. R. 523 (p. 7, LL 23-24). Mr.
Parks is a licensed pharmacist. R. 209 (p. 21, LL 6-19).

2.

Appraisal of the Actual Cash Value and Payment

Immediately following the June 28, 2012, fire, Safeco hired an appraiser, Robert K.
Jones, to determine the actual cash value (ACV) of the lost property-that is, "the market value
· of property in a used condition equal to that of the lost or damaged property, if reasonably
available on the used market." R. 341 ("Policy Definitions",

,r 3(a)(2)). See also R. 526 (p.

19,

LL 4-6) (Mrs. Parks understood ACV to be market value); R. 1014, ,r 3. Mrs. Parks understood
1 The

Amended Judgment was filed after the Clerk's Record had already been lodged with this
Court, and, therefore, is not part of the record on appeal.
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from the policy that Safeco would first pay the ACV, then deal with the replacement value once
a replacement had been made. R. 526 (p. 19, LL 11-20).
Mr. Jones prepared his report on July 21, 2012. See generally, R. 374, et seq.; R. 1017,
Ex. A. In accordance with standard practices for appraisers, Mr. Jones determined the value of
the home based on information from the Plaintiffs, Safeco, and the County Assessor's office,
together with a comparison to the best comparable properties available in the Pocatello area
market. R. 1014-1015,

,r,r 5-6

and 11. Mr. Jones took into account that the house was a single

story home with a finished walk-out basement in determining its market value. R. 1015, ,i,r 7-10.
Mr. Jones appraised the total value of Plaintiffs' property at $244,000, representing
$75,000 for the lot, and $169,000 for the structure. R. 377. A check for $169,000 was mailed to
Plaintiffs on or about July 27, 2012. Plaintiffs acknowledge receiving the check. R. 223 (p. 76,
LL 13-15). Plaintiffs understood that the $169,000 payment was the ACV payment. R. 528 (p.
27, LL 18-20; p. 28, LL 18-25).
Mr. Parks did not believe the process of the appraisal was incorrect, but that the appraised
value was too low. R. 234 (p. 120, LL 22-24). Mrs. Parks also believed that the ACV was too
low. R. 529 (p. 30, LL 12-15). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs never obtained a different estimate of the
ACV. Prior to the fire, the Parks had not had the property appraised. R. 212 (p. 30, LL 12-14); R.
213 (p. 37, LL 12-21); R. 523 (p. 9, LL 9-10). They had not received any offers to buy the home.
R. 212 (p. 30, LL 15-20); R. 523 (p. 8, L. 22-p. 9, L. 4).

Although Mr. Parks was surprised that the market value was not closer to the replacement
value, he acknowledged that he did not have any grounds to argue with the appraisal of the
market value of the home. R. 222-223 (p. 73, L. 19 - p. 74, L. 8). Mr. Parks testified that he did
not know what to think about the ACY amount because "I didn't know what the market was
because we weren't looking." R. 227 (p. 90, LL 11-16). He also did not ask or tell Ms.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 4

Abendschein that he wanted to get his own market value appraisal. R. 227 (p. 90, LL 17-21). In
fact, Mr. Parks did not express any concern to her that he felt that the $169,000 valuation might
be low, but merely assumed she would know he was upset. R. 228 (p. 97, L. 3 -p. 98, L. 1). See

also R. 237 (p. 131, L. 25 - p. 132, L. 8) (admitting he did not have any additional conversations
with anyone at Safeco concerning benefits under the policy). The Parks did not obtain their own
appraisal. R. 533 (p. 46, LL 2-3); R. 536 (p. 60, LL 15-17).
Mr. Parks did, however, go to see Mr. Jones. See, generally R. 232-233 (pp. 113-117).
Mr. Parks testified that Mr. Jones told him the total amount of the appraisal, and that the amount
included the value of the land. R. 233 (p. 115, LL 22-25). Mr. Jones also explained that he was
"strictly regulated by federal guidelines," and how those guidelines impacted his appraisal. R.
233 (p. 117, LL 3-7). Mr. Parks thanked Mr. Jones and left. R. 233 (p. 117, LL 9-10). Mr. Parks
did not thereafter discuss with anyone about obtaining a different appraisal. R. 234 (p. 118, L. 22
- p. 119, L. 1). And he did not speak with Ms. Abendschein again. R. 234 (p. 120, LL 1-6).
Moreover, Mr. Parks understood that he would receive additional funds ifhe rebuilt the house or
purchased a different home. R. 234 (p. 119, LL 2-18).

3.

Communications Regarding the ACV Payment

In a separate letter to Plaintiffs dated July 27, 2012, Ms. Abendschein informed Plaintiffs
that the $169,000 "has been sent to you [under a separate cover] for the Actual Cash Value of the
dwelling ... per the enclosed Market Value appraisal." R. 371. Apparently after receiving the
check, but before receiving the letter from Ms. Abendschein, Mr. Parks contacted her about the
payment See generally R. 223-224 (pp. 75-79). In his conversation with her, Mr. Parks asked
Ms. Abendschein whether the check was everything they were going to receive for their loss.
According to Mr. Park's testimony, she replied: ''No, this is just the beginning." R. 223 (p. 76,
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LL 20-25). Mr. Park indicated that Ms. Abendschein next began talking about options,
explaining what 'just the beginning meant," when he interrupted her to ask if that was all the
Parks would get if they took money and ran. R. 223-224 (p. 77, LL 3-7; 78, LL 4-8). Mr. Parks
acknowledged that Ms. Abendschein had given him options as to obtaining coverage under the
replacement cost, and that she had not told him that he and his wife's recovery was limited to the
$169,000. R. 228 (p. 95, L. 18 -p. 96, L. 2).
The Parks allege that they did not negotiate the check for $169,000 initially, and suggest·
that Safeco had not authorized them to cash the check. 2 R. 15, ,i 11 and R. 16, ,r 16. However, in
his deposition, Mr. Parks admitted that Ms. Abendschein had not told him that the Parks could
not cash the check. R. 224 (p. 80, LL 11-16). He also testified that he and his wife "didn't need
to cash the check." R. 229 (p. 100, LL 10-11 ). If he had reservations about cashing the check or
the amount, he did not raise it during his conversation with Ms. Abendschein at that time, or
during later conversations or emails with her. R. 224 (p. 80, LL 17-21); R. 226 (p. 88, LL 2-20);
R. 227-228 (p. 93, L. 14 - p. 94, L. 3); R. 229 (p. 100, LL 18-20). See also R. 228 (p. 96, LL 5-

14) (discussing August 1, 2002 email from Mr. Parks to Ms. Abendschein which only concerned
issues of demolition and cleaning up the property). In fact, Mr. Parks acknowledged that he did
not believe he had any reason to not cash the check. R. 224 (p. 80, LL 22-25). He also admitted
that there was nothing to prevent him from calling Ms. Abendschein about questions or concerns
regarding the check. R. 229-230 (p. 101, L. 21 - p. 102, L. 1). In fact, he had previously cashed a
check for other coverage under the policy without any misgivings. R. 229 (p. 101, LL 2-4); R.
528 (p. 27, LL 21-25).

2 The

Parks eventually cashed the check in the fall of 2012. R. 231 (p. 108, LL 24-25).
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4.

Communications Regarding Additional Amounts for the Structure

The July 27, 2012, letter discussed above further indicated that there was a total of
$464,875 available coverage limits for replacing the property, but "[i]n order to claim the full
replacement cost, you must replace the dwelling." R. 371. The letter referenced the relevant
terms of the policy and informed Plaintiffs that "[w]e are in the process of obtaining a
replacement cost bid for equivalent construction of your home. . . . You may replace your
dwelling on the existing location; build on a new location or purchase an existing home." R. 372.
Ms. Abendschein also indicated that she "would like to review these options and discuss your
replacement cost coverage in more detail with you." Id.
Mr. Parks believed that he understood the contents of the letter, including the basis of the
$169,000. R. 224 (p. 81, LL 15-20). Mr. Parks admitted that, based on the letter, that theACV or
market value was just the starting point in adjusting the claim, and he had to make a decision on
how to replace the property. R. 225 (p. 83, LL 18-24). See also R. 237 (p. 132, L. 23 -p. 133, L.
4) (admitting that Ms. Abendschein's letters indicated the Parks would get additional money
when they replaced their house); R. 531-532 (p. 38, LL 4-8; p. 38, L. 25 - p. 39, L. 6; p. 42, LL
8-11) (acknowledging that Ms. Abendschein' s letters do not restrict recovery to ACV). Mr. Parks
knew that Safeco would pay the full amount it cost to replace the dwelling when the Parks
incurred the cost of such replacement. R. 225 (p. 83, LL 5-17); R. 238 (p. 137, LL 12-17). Mrs.
Parks likewise understood Ms. Abendschein's communications as stating that "when we [the
Parks] finally purchased a home that we would receive the cost." R. 532 (p. 42, LL 17-19).

Mr. Parks also admitted that Ms. Abendschein set out the options available to the Parks,
including replacing their dwelling at its existing location, build on a new location, or purchase an
existing home. R. 225-226 (p. 85, L. 2 - p. 86, L. 6). Mr. Parks also recollected Ms.
Abendschein going over these same options with him via telephone. R. 226 (p. 86, L. 24 - p. 87,
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L. 2). Significantly, Mr. Parks testified that he understood from this information that whatever
option he chose, Safeco would pay the lowest or smallest amount of what the Parks actually
incurred. R. 226 (p. 87, L. 19 - p. 88, L. 1); R. 226-227 (p. 89, L. 23 - p. 90, L. 3); R. 238 (p.
137, LL 12-17); R. 238-239 (p. 137, L. 21-p. 138, L. 5).

Mr. Parks acknowledged that the Ms. Abendschein had said to call anytime with
questions, but that he did not ask her anything. R. 225 (p. 82, LL 20-22); R. 226 (p. 86, LL 7-11).
Mrs. Parks likewise never raised any concerns with Ms. Abendschein. R. 531 (p. 38, LL 9-13; p.

41, LI. IA).
5.

Cost of Replacement

Although Plaintiffs had not yet decided whether to rebuild the structure or purchase a
different house,3 on July 26, 2012, Safeco asked Belfor Property Restoration ("Belfor") for an
estimate of the cost to replace the house--i.e., "the cost, at the time of loss, to repair or replace
the damaged property with new materials of like kind and quality, without deduction for
depreciation." R. 343 "Policy Definitions",

il 3(m)(l)) (defining "replacement cost"). Mr. Parks

understood that Safeco was going to obtain an estimate so the Parks would have that information
when deciding what option to pursue. R. 226 (p. 87, LL 13-18); R. 227 (p. 90, L. 22 - p. 91, L.
1).
Belfore's estimate, dated September 13, 2012, indicated a total cost of $440,195.55, or,
net of the $500 deductible, $439,695.55, to rebuild the Autumn Lane structure. R. 429. Mr. Parks
remembered receiving the bid and accompanying letter for his review. R. 230 (p. 104, LL 14-24).
Mr. and Mrs. Parks understood the bid to be what it would cost to build a comparable home on
the existing lot. R. 230 (p. 105, LL 5-17); R. 235 (p. 123, LL 10-22); R. 235 (p. 125, LL 3-6); R.

Mr. and Mrs. Parks testified that building a house on a different lot was never their plan. R. 231
(p. 107, LL 6-9); R. 530 (p. 35, LL 20-21).
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532 (p. 43, Ll. 11-12); R. 536 (p. 60, LL 18-21). Mr. Parks also understood that ifit cost less to
rebuild or replace the house, he and his wife would only receive the lesser amount. R. 235 (p.
124, LL 1-6); R. 236 (p. 126, LL 7-19); R. 238 (p. 137, L. 21-p. 138, L. 5). See also R. 237 (p.
130, LI. 10-16); R. 239 (p. 139, L. 24-p. 140, L. 16); R. 251 (p. 188, LL 6-20).

Mr. Parks also acknowledged that Ms. Abendschein had not stated that the Parks would
receive the full rebuild amount regardless of whether the Parks rebuilt the structure. R. 235 (p.
125, LL 16-22). Mrs. Parks similarly acknowledged that to "incur" a cost, the Parks would have
to actually spend something. R. 532 (p. 42, L. 24 - p. 43, L. 6; p. 45, LL 2-23).
Mr. Parks testified that he had no concerns regarding the bid, and understood it to be just
one of various options. R. 234 (p. 121, LL 8-13). In that regard, Mr. Parks testified:
Q.

December 26, 2012, do you know what the basis was for
Mr. Hawkes to be requesting $440,195.55 from Safeco?

A.

My feeling is that we lost what it would cost to replace.
We weren't in the market to sell. So, the appraisal to me
was of no benefit.

Q.

Okay. Now, you had an option to replace it, didn't you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And Safeco would have paid you up to $440,195.55,
correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

But you chose not to use that option, didn't you?

A.

Yes.

R. 240 (p. 143, L. 23 - p. 144, L. 12). Mr. Parks acknowledged that there was no document
where Safeco agreed to be bound by the $440,195.55 if the Parks did not rebuild on the Autumn
Lane property. R. 244 (p. 158, L. 24- p. 159, L. 2). Mrs. Parks testified that no one with Safeco
had promised to pay $440,195.55 regardless of how the Autumn Lane structure was replaced. R.
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535 (p. 56, Ll. 6-13). In fact, as of the Plaintiffs' demand on December 26, 2012 (R. 444 Exhibit

27) for $440,195.55, the Plaintiffs had not spent $440,195.55 or incurred that amount. R. 536 (p.
58, Ll. 7-16). Mr. Park admits that his assertion of "actual loss" is premised, as he described it,
on "my definition of actual loss is different than theirs"-that is, different from that in the Policy.
R. 247 (p. 172, LL 12-16).

6.

Decision to Purchase a Different Home

Although the Parks began leaning toward the idea of purchasing another house rather
than rebuilding on their lot, they still had not made a decision before mid-October 2012, nor had
they started looking for a replacement home. R. 231 (p. 107, L. 12 - p. 108, L. 23). By October
17, 2012, Mr. and Mrs. Parks had decided to not rebuild the structure. R. 234 (p. 121, LL 14-19).

See also R. 245 (p. 165, L. 6); R. 246 (p. 166, LL 11-14) (Mr. Parks confirming that they-the
Parks-had chosen not to rebuild the destroyed home); R. 534 (p. 50, LL 17-19 (Mrs. Parks
testifying that they had decided to purchase an existing home). Rather, they purchased a home
outside ofldaho Falls on December 6, 2012. R. 236 (p. 128, LL 15-18).
The Idaho Falls property cost $300,000, including the value of the land. 4 R. 240 (p. 143,
L. 11-20). See also R. 249 (p. 178, L. 3 - p. 179, L. 6 (describing sources of funds for the
purchase). Mr. Parks admitted that he and his wife had not incurred $440,195.55 in costs, but
that the figure only represented the amount in the bid. R. 239-240 (p. 140, L. 24 - 143, L. 5); R.
240 (p. 144, Ll. 16-24); R. 242 (p. 150, LL 17-18); R. 243 (p. 157, LL 11-16). The cost they

. actually incurred to replace their destroyed house was $300,000 (less the value of the land). R.
242 (p. 151, LL 8-12). The Parks did not incur any rebuilding costs. R. 246 (p. 168, L. 22 - p.

4

Plaintiffs do not dispute the valuation assigned by the Company to the value of the underlying
land or lot for the Idaho Falls property. R. 537 (p. 65, LI. 19-24).
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169, L. 5); R. 247 (p. 171, LL 9-11). They never paid Belfor any amount to rebuild the house at
Autumn Lane. R. 248 (p. 175, Ll. 2-18).
The Parks received the closing documents after they purchased the Idaho Falls residence,
and started moving in by mid-December 2012. R. 236 (p. 129, LL 2-9). See also R. 535 (p. 57,
LL 16-22) (Mrs. Parks stating that the Parks had moved into the Idaho Falls home by December
20, 2012, and received the closing documents by that time). Plaintiffs' counsel informed Safeco
in his December 26, 2012, letter that "[t]he Parks have exercised their option to 'purchase an
existing home' referenced on page 2 of your July 31, 2012, letter; they have purchased an
existing home in the Idaho Falls area, having chosen to not rebuild in the barren, burned
environment where the fire that consumed their home was located." R. 444, Ex. 27) (italics in
original).
Ms. Abendschein wrote to Plaintiffs' counsel on December 27, 2012, requesting
documentation of the purchase price of the Parks' replacement home. R. 242 (p. 152, LL 1-7)
and R. 446 (Exhibit 28). Mr. Parks testified that he provided the closing documents to his
attorney as soon as he was asked for it. R. 242-243 (p. 153, L. 19 -p. 154, L. 5). On January 22,
2013, Ms. Abendschein again wrote to Plaintiffs' counsel requesting documentation as to the
price of the Parks' replacement home. R. 448. Mr. Parks recollected seeing the letter. R. 243 (p.
154, LL 10-12). Even though Mr. Parks knew that Safeco needed the information to move
forward with additional payments, he was not concerned that the information had not been
provided. R. 243 (p. 155, LL 7-14).
On January 23, 2013, responding to a letter from the Parks' attorney, Ms. Abendschein
again noted that "[y]our client has not provided the necessary documents necessary in order for
us to determine the replacement costs claimed." R.. 450. Mr. Parks was also unconcerned at that
time. R. 244 (p. 158, LL 11-15). Ms. Abendschein again requested the information on the house
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purchase on March 2, 2013. R. 453. Mr. Parks testified that he did not understand that the
information had not been provided, but was, nevertheless, unconcerned. R. 244 (p. 159, LL 1021). In additional letters, dated March 29 and April 26, 2013, respectively, Ms. Abendschein
again requested information on the cost of the Parks' replacement house. R. 455 (Exhibit 33) and
R. 457 (Exhibit 34).

Finally, via a letter dated May 31, 2013, Plaintiffs' counsel forwarded copies of the
closing documents on the Parks new home. R. 459 (Exhibit 35). Mr. Parks had no idea how long
his attorney had the records or when he took the documents to his attorney's office. R. 246 (p.
166, L. 22 - p. 167, L. 4). Neither did Mrs. Parks. R. 537 (p. 64, LL 1-3). On June 8, 2013,
Safeco indicated it would pay an additional amount representing the difference between the
replacement cost and the ACV. See R. 486 (Exhibit 36). Safeco calculated the amount owed as
$86,000 ($300,000 for the cost of new home, less $45,000 for the land, less the $169,000
previously paid). R. 491 (Exhibit 39). Safeco paid that amount to the Parks. R. 248 (p. 177, L. 6
- p. 178, p. 2). At that time, the Plaintiffs had not incurred any amount beyond the price of the
Idaho Falls home to replace the Autumn Lane residence. R. 537 (p. 64, LL 16-20). Mrs. Parks
agreed that Safeco had paid for the totality of the replacement home. R. 538 (p. 66, LL 1-4).

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard for this Court's review of a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary
judgment is the same standard as used by the trial court in ruling on the original motion.

Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C, 140 Idaho 354, 360, 93 P.3d 685, 691 (2004). A party
is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 12

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). "When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response ... must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e).
Should this Court find the decision of the lower court to be based on an erroneous theory,
the Court will nonetheless uphold the lower court's decision if any alternative legal basis can be
found to support it. Martel v. Bulotti, 138 Idaho 451, 454-55, 65 P.3d 192, 195-96 (2003). In
doing so, "[t]his Court may apply the law to undisputed facts de novo." Id., 138 Idaho at 455.

III.
ARGUMENT
A.

APPELLANTS HAVE WAIVED THEIR ARGUMENT CONCERNING DIRECT
FINANCIAL LOSS

Appellants' initial argument presented on appeal is that the District Court erred by not
considering whether Appellants were entitled to their "direct financial loss" under the loss
settlement provision for actual cash value (ACV). However, this was not an issue raised below.
The only reference in the Appellants' summary judgment brief concerning "direct financial loss"
pertained to section (1) the replacement cost provision of the Policy. 5 See R. 929-930. Similarly,

5 This

·(1)

provision provides:
We will pay the full cost of repair or replacement, but not exceeding the smallest of the
following amounts:
(a)

the limit of liability under the policy applying to Coverage A or B;

(b)

the replacement cost of that part of the damaged building for equivalent
construction and use in the same premises as determined shortly following the
loss;
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in their reply brief to the District Court, Appellants again only referenced the "direct financial
loss" language in section (1) of the replacement cost provisions of the Policy. See R. 1044-1045.
This Court has held that, with the exception of jurisdictional issues, an argument not
raised below is waived on appeal. Minor Miracle Productions, LLC v. Starkey, 152 Idaho 33 3,
335, 271 P.3d 1189, 1191 (2012). Consequently, Appellants' contention that the Court erred by
not considering "direct financial loss" under the ACV provisions of the Policy has been waived.
B.

APPELLANTS DID NOT INCUR A LOSS EQUAL TO THE REBUILD
ESTIMATE
Appellants contend that, per the Policy, they were entitle to recover "the direct financial

loss" they incurred; and, further, that "the direct financial loss" was the amount estimated by
Belfor to reconstructed the same house on the Appellants' lot on Autumn Lane in Pocatello.
Unlike their argument before the District Court, Appellants' now cite to the provision of the
Policy dealing with payment of the actual cash value of the home.
"Where the language used in an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, the language
must be given its plain, ordinary meaning." Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Kinsey, 149
Idaho 415,419,234 P.3d 739, 743 (2010). "In insurance cases money becomes due as provided
under the express terms of the insurance contract." Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of
Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 593, 130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006). The relevant portion of the Policy

states:
(c)

the full amount actually and necessarily incurred to repair or replace the damaged
building as determined shortly following the loss;

(d)

the direct financial loss you incur; or

(e)

· our pro rata share of any loss when divided with any other valid and collectible
insurance applying to the covered property at the time of loss.

R. 330 (emphasis in original).
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5.

Loss Settlement. Covered property losses are settled as
follows:

(4)

***

You may disregard the replacement cost loss
settlement provisions and make claim under this
policy for loss or damage to buildings on an actual
cash value basis but not exceeding the smallest of
the following amounts:
(a)

the applicabie limit ofiiability;

(b)

the direct financial loss you incur; or

(c)

our pro rata share of any loss when divided
with any other valid and collectible
insurance apply to the covered property at
the time of the loss.

You may still make claim on a replacement cost basis by
notifying us of your intent to do so within 180 days after
the date of loss.
R. 330 (emphasis in original). "Actual cash value" is a defined term in the Policy. It is defined as

follows:
a.

"Actual cash value"

( 1)

When damage to property is economically
repairable, actual cash value shall mean the cost of
materials and labor that would be necessary to
repair the damage, less reasonable deduction for
wear and tear, deterioration and obsolescence.

(2)

When damage to property is not economically
repairable or loss prevents repair, actual cash value
shall mean the market value of property in a used
condition equal to that of the lost or damaged
property, less reasonable deduction for wear and
tear, deterioration and obsolescence.

(3)

Otherwise, actual cash value shall mean the market
value of new, identical or nearly identical property,
less reasonable deduction for wear and tear,
deterioration and obsolescence.
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(4)

Actual cash value shall not include taxes or any
expenses unless incurred following the loss.

R. 341 (emphasis in original).

The District Court held that Appellants' home was not repairable because it was
completely destroyed in the subject fire. R. 1063. Thus, provision (2) is the applicable definition,
which means that the actual cash value of the home was "the market vaiue of [the] property in a
used condition equal to that of the lost or damaged property," less wear and tear. This was
amount determined by Mr. Robert Jones, and never challenged by the Appellants, and which
Safeco paid to the Appellants in the summer of 2014. Nothing in the language cited above allows
Appellants to obtain an amount in excess of the market value of their property under an actual
cash value basis.

Moreover, the amount of the Belfor estimate was not a loss incurred by the Appellants.
When addressing Appellants' "direct financial loss" argument raised as to section (1) of the
Replacement Cost provision of the Policy, the District Court specifically rejected the argument
that the repair estimate was a loss incurred by the Appellants. See R. 1064-1065. The District
Court wrote:
Black's Law Dictionary defines "incur" as "to suffer or bring on
oneself (a liability or expense)." .:. Here, Plaintiffs incurred or
brought on themselves an expense to replace their destroyed home
by buying a replacement home in Idaho Falls. The term "incur" is
not subject to conflicting interpretations. In fact, Plaintiff [sic] has
not proffered a conflicting definition of incur, but simply asserted
the definition should include incurred repair estimates. However,
repair estimates are clearly not expenses suffered or brought on
oneself. Repair estimates are a rough calculation of the costs to
repair something in the future, not a definite expense that is being
incurred presently....
R. 1065. Appellants still offer no explanation as to why "incur" should include repair estimates

in excess of the actual cash value of the house - costs never incurred by Appellants.
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Appellants further contend that Mr. Jones valuation of the ACV was incorrect. But they
have failed to provide expert evidence from an appraiser showing that Mr. Jones' valuation of
the ACV was incorrect.
Appellants also contend that Safeco agreed to be bound by the Belfor estimate. However,
that is not what was agreed by Safeco. Rather, Safeco indicated in its response to Appellants'
counsel that "[t]his will confirm that the rebuild estimate provided by Belfor Restoration in the
amount of $440,195.55 has been approved. We will pay the replacement cost of the dwelling up
[to] $440,195.55 or the amount actually incurred, whichever is less." R. 438.
For the reasons cited above, the Court should affirm the District Court's grant of
summary judgment.
C.

THE IDAHO FALLS HOME REPLACED THE POCATELLO STRUCTURE

As noted in footnote 5 above, the Policy provides that "[w]e [i.e., Safco] will pay the full
cost of repair or replacement, but not exceeding the smallest of the following amounts .... " One
of the measures listed was "the full amount actually and necessarily incurred to repair or replace
the damaged building as determined shortly following the loss." See R. 330.
The contract language plainly states that Safeco would pay the smallest of several
measures of the cost to repair or replace the structure; and not, as the Appellants argue,
"replacement cost" irrespective of the other measures of damage. In this case, subparagraph (c)
applies because "the full amount actually and necessarily incurred to ... replace the damaged
building"-i.e., the purchase price of the replacement home-was less than "replacement cost."
Appellants also argue that there is nothing in the Loss Settlement provisions that reduces
coverage for the total loss of a fully-insured home just because the insureds buy or build a
smaller home. That is also incorrect. Rather, nothing in the Loss Settlement provisions requires
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payment of policy limits. The provision that "[w]e will pay the full cost of repair or replacement,
but not exceeding the smallest of the following amounts: ... ," supports the payment based on the
cost of the Idaho Falls home purchased by the Appellants. And, to the extent that the Appellants
suggest that they received less than the value of the Autumn Lane home, Safeco would note that
they received substantially more from Safeco than the market value of the Autumn Lane
property.

In short, as the District Court correctly noted, the Belfor estimate is not the smallest of
the measures of reimbursement, but that was the cost of the Idaho Falls home. R. 1066. The
District Court also correctly determined that it was uncontroverted that the Appellants purchased
the home in Idaho Falls to replace their residence that had burned in Pocatello. R. 1066. Thus,
this Court should uphold the District Court's grant of summary judgment to Safeco.
D.

THE APPELLANTS' FURTHER ARGUMENT ON "INCUR" IS IRRELEVANT
IN LIGHT OF THEIR REPLACEMENT OF THE STRUCTURE BY
PURCHASING ANOTHER HOME

"Point Three" of Appellants' argument is that the District Court erred by not applying a
definition of "incur" that was favorable to the Appellants. This is merely another attempt by
Appellants to argue that they had "incurred" the amount of the Belfor estimate to reconstruct the
structure at Autumn Lane. As discussed in more detail above, the District Court correctly
determined that the meaning of "incur" did not include the repair estimates. Contrary to the
Appellants' arguments, the District Court nowhere in its opinion states that "incur" required
Appellants to incur a debt. Moreover, the Appellants are arguing for more than the smallest of
the allowable measure of damages under the Policy.
Appellants had a choice to rebuild the Autumn Lane home or purchase a replace
property. They chose the latter. Having done so, the rebuild estimate became irrelevant to
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determining damages. The Policy expressly provided for paying to the Appellants the smallest of
several measures of damage, including the amount of another property purchased to replace the
lost structure. Safeco did so, and fully complied with the terms of the Policy. Accordingly, the
District Court's grant of summary judgment was correct, and should be upheld by this Court.
E.

THE ARGUMENT CONCERl~iNG "DETERiviINED SHORTLY FOLLO'WL.~G
THE LOSS" WAS NOT RAISED BELOW AND HAS BEEN WAIVED

The Appellants note that the relevant portion of the replacement cost provision of the
Policy provides that one of the measure of allowable benefits is "the full amount actually and
necessarily incurred to repair or replace the damaged building as determined shortly following
the loss." Appellants attach a special significance to the phrase "determined shortly following the
loss."
As noted above, an argument not raised before the District Court is waived and cannot be
raised on appeal. Minor Miracle Productions, LLC v. Starkey, supra, 152 Idaho 333, 335, 271
P.3d 1189, 1191 (2012). Appellants made no argument before the District Court emphasizing the
time period that a determination must be made. Accordingly, the argument has been waived.
F.

THE APPELLANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO PAYMENT BEFORE THE
AMOUNT OF LOSS WAS DETERMINED

Appellants' fourth argument is that "determined shortly following the loss" from the
phrase "the full amount actually and necessarily incurred to repair or replace the damaged
building as determined shortly following the loss," required Safeco to pay them the amount of
the rebuild estimate, although Appellants had not determined whether to purchase or rebuild a
property.
Apparently Appellants are arguing that they should benefit from their own delay in
deciding whether to rebuild or purchase a separate property. To the extent that the Appellants
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suggest that Safeco should have simply paid them policy limits or the "replacement cost" prior to
Appellants making a decision as to whether they would replace or rebuild the house, that would
run contrary to the provision that limited the policy to the smallest of the measures of loss under
the Loss Payment provisions. Accordingly, the only option for payment until the Parks made up
their minds was for Safeco to pay the ACV value of the lost home-just as it did.
Besides the concerns Appellants' argument raises about their duties under equity and the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Appellants also ignore the requirement that the
amount must still be incurred. Appellants never "incurred" a cost or expense for rebuilding the
lost structure; certainly they had not entered into a contract to rebuild the property in question.
Instead, they chose to purchase a replacement property approximately 5 months after the loss. If
any party was potentially harmed by the delay, it was Safeco. However, Safeco has not argued
that the valuation of the replacement home was not "determined shortly following the loss."
Thus, the issue is moot.

If the Appellants are instead arguing that "determined shortly following the loss" require
payment of the replacement cost to have been made earlier than it was, the Policy has separate,
more specific provisions, regarding when payment would be made. See R. 331. Specifically,
Safeco was not required to make payment until 30 days after it reached an agreement with
Appellants, there was entry of a final judgment, or an appraisal award was filed with the
Company. Payment was made prior to any of the foregoing events and, therefore, was timely.
Plaintiffs rely on a statement by their expert, Charles Miller, who purports to interpret
certain portions of the insurance contract. Safeco pointed out to the District Court that Mr.
Miller's opinion as to the interpretation of the contract is inadmissible. Rule 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
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experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise.
(Underline added). Accordingly, an expert has no place in determining issues of law. And, m
fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that expert opinion is irrelevant to a determination of an
issue of law, such as interpretation of a contract. Howard v. Or. Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 214,
219, 46 P.3d 510,515 (2002).
The contract speaks for itself. The District Court correctly determined that Safeco had
employed a correct measure of the amount owed under the Policy and timely paid that amount to
Appellants. Thus, the Court should uphold the District Court's grant of summary judgment.

G.

SAFECO WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS OF
BAD FAITH AND ESTOPPEL
As the District Court correctly notes, a claim of bad faith is predicated on there being a

breach of contract. R. 1068. To establish a claim for the tort of bad faith, the insured must show
that: (1) the insurer intentionally and unreasonably denied or delayed payment; (2) the claim was
not fairly debatable; (3) the insurer's denial or delay was not the result of good faith mistake; and
(4) the resulting harm is not fully compensable by contract damages. Rizzo v. State Farm Ins.

Co., 155 Idaho 75, 305 P.3d 519, 527-28 (2013). The insured must also show that he was entitled
to recover under the Policy. Id. at 528. That is, "[a]lthough the tort of bad faith is not a breach of
contract claim, to find that [the insurer] committed bad faith in handling [the claim], there must
also have been a duty under the contract that was breached." Weinstein v. Prudential Property

and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299,315,233 P.3d 1221, 1237 (2010). The plaintiff in a bad faith
action bears the burden of proof as to all elements of the prima facie case. Robinson v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 177, 45 P.3d 829, 833 (2002). In this case, as the

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 21

District Court determined, there was no breach of contract. Thus, the claim of bad faith
necessarily fails.
Appellants also maintain that payment of ACY in July 2014 acted as an estoppel or
waiver on the part of Safeco. In Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., supra, this
Court held that where an insurer was able to determine a portion of an insured's damages that
were justly due under the Policy, the insurer was obligated to make payment even if the claim
was not fully adjusted. In this case, that is what Safeco did; and then paid the remainder due
under the Policy once the Appella..11ts' had purchased a replacement home and provided the
documentation to Safeco. Thus, there was no estoppel or waiver on Safeco's part by advancing
the ACY of the Pocatello home prior to the Appellants' decision to rebuild or purchase a
replacement home.
H.

APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES
Appellants' claim attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 41-1839, which provides for

attorney's fees when an insurer fails to pay the amount justly due within 30 days after the insured
has furnished a proof of loss. LC. § 41-1839(1). Safeco paid the ACY within 30 days of
receiving the valuation from Mr. Jones. Safeco paid the difference between ACY and the
replacement cost within 30 days of receiving documentation of the purchase price of the Idaho
Falls home. Consequently, Appellants are not entitled to attorney's fees under Idaho Code 411839.

I.

SAFECO IS ENTITLED TO ITS COSTS AND FEES
The Idaho Code provides that in coverage disputes, "attorney's fees may be awarded by

the court when it finds, from the facts presented to it that a case was brought, pursued or
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." I.C. § 41-1839(4). In this case, the
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 22

language of the Policy was clear. All amounts justly due to the Appellants were timely and
promptly paid. Appellants have argued issues on appeal that were not raised before the District
Court, and failed to support its arguments with fact or law. Consequently, Safeco should be
awarded its attorney's fees on appeal.
Safeco asserts that it should be awarded costs of appeal as a matter of right should it be
found to be the prevailing party. I.A.R. 40.

IV.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the District Court's Decision and Order on the cross
motions for summary judgment should be affirmed.

I
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DATED t h i s ~ day of January, 2016.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

By-----~~(~~~
Mark D. Sebastian, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
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